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Sentencing Guidelines in the States:
Lessons for State and Federal Reformers

state sentencing guidelines reforms are
areguidelines,
adopting
more states
thriving.
nlike the More
deeplyand
troubled
federal
guidelines, and the American Bar Association has
recently renewed and strengthened its support for this
approach. As illustrated by the sampling of jurisdictions represented in this Issue,, state guidelines are
incredibly diverse in their origins, purposes, and
provisions. The state systems and the ABA Standards
also reveal a number of important features not found in
the federal guidelines. For readers whose primary
concern is reform at the federal level, there is much to
be learned from the state experiences related in these
essays, and in the steadily growing literature on these
and other state sentencing reforms. There is also much
that the states can learn from each other.
State guidelines display at least five important
features which distinguish them from the federal
guidelines.
First,they have generally achieved broad
acceptance once adopted.,
Second, all state guideline systems (as well as
the ABA Standards) reject routine sentence enhancements based on unconvicted, "real offense" factors.
Third, state guideline reforms are increasingly
motivated by a desire to gain better control over
escalating prison populations; several states (and the
ABA Standards) directly link recommended sentences
to available correctional resources.
Fourth,the focus on prison capacity limits has
encouraged state reformers to give increasing emphasis
to the development and structuring of non-prison
sanctions, especially for non-violent and first offenders.
Fifth, state reforms have generated much more
published data and outside evaluations than has the
federal version.
Part I of this essay provides a brief summary of
state systems and their major variations. Part II
returns to the five features noted above, explains why
they are so important, and suggests the areas in
which further research and debate are most needed.
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I. Overview-Where, When & What Kinds of State
Guidelines?
Presumptive sentencing rules have now been adopted
in at least seventeen states. 3 Those states, and the dates
on which their guidelines became (or will become)
effective, are as follows: Alaska (198o); Minnesota
(I98O); Pennsylvania (1982); Florida (1983); Michigan
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(1984); Washington (1984); Utah (1985); Wisconsin
(1985); Delaware (1987); Oregon (1989); Tennessee
(1989); Virginia ('99'); Louisiana (1992); Kansas (1993);
Arkansas ('994); North Carolina (1995); and Ohio
(1996). The seventeen guideline jurisdictions differ
widely in their approaches. The most important variations are summarized below, along with some comparisons to the federal system.
A. Nature of the Sentencing Commission

All guideline states but one (Alaska) have established a
permanent sentencing commission or a similar body
with authority to study sentencing practices and
recommend guidelines. All of these commissions have
some degree of legislative support, but some (e.g.,
Virginia's) are located entirely within the judicial
branch. Most sentencing commissions are broadly
representative, including a mix of judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, correctional officials, public
members, and sometimes legislators.
Legislatively-created commissions differ greatly in
their roles relative to the Legislature. 4 Minnesota's
enabling statute gave the Commission relatively little
guidance. In recent years, the Legislature has taken
back some of the authority it delegated, but the
Minnesota Commission still retains primary control
over the formulation of state-wide sentencing policy.
In contrast, other state legislatures have played a much
more active role, either by carefully structuring the
commission's mandate (e.g., Arkansas), or by dominating the guidelines revision process (Washington).
B. Binding Force of the Guidelines

Most state guidelines recommend presumptivelycorrect sentences which judges are bound to follow
unless they depart, but several states (Delaware,
Michigan, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin) have purely
voluntary guidelines. Even within the group of states
whose guidelines are not formally voluntary, standards
for departure and for reversal on appeal vary widely:
Pennsylvania guideline sentences are rarely reversed
on appeal except for procedural reasons (e.g., failure to
state any reasons), whereas reversal on substantive
grounds (improper sentence) has often occurred in
states such as Washington and Minnesota, each of
which now has a large body of substantive appellate
caselaw. But even in these states, trial courts retain
substantial areas of discretion, as to both the type and
the severity of sanctions. In this respect, the federal
guidelines appear to be uniquely rigid.
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C. Scope of Guideline Coverage
Most state guideline systems cover felony crimes only.
All guidelines regulate aspects of both prison commitment and prison duration, and some also control the
use of consecutive sentences. States differ in the extent
to which statutorily-based mandatory-minimum
prison terms determine or override guidelines rules.
Such statutes play a smaller role in some states (e.g.,
Minnesota) than in the federal system.
Some guideline states (Pennsylvania, Michigan,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin) have not abolished
parole release. In these states, the guidelines determine
either the minimum or the maximum prison term to be
served, but not both. The new ABA Standards recommend abolition of parole. This change from the 1979
edition may be related to the ABA's current focus on
"front-end" resource-matching.
As for non-prison sentences, the guideline states
(as well as the new ABA Standards) give greater
emphasis than do the federal guidelines to probation
and other intermediate sanctions. This difference is
probably due in part to differences between state and
federal caseloads, but it may also reflect a generally
less punitive approach by the states, as well as a greater
emphasis on the goal of preventing prison overcrowding. The states differ greatly in the degree to which they
regulate the conditions of non-prison sentences and
decisions to revoke probation and post-prison release.
D. Nature and Priority of Sentencing Reform Goals
All state guideline reforms reflect a desire to make
sentencing more uniform and to eliminate unwarranted
disparities. Beyond this, however, the declared or apparent
goals and priorities of these reforms are diverse. Those
states which have abolished parole release and substituted
limited "good time" credits, were often responding to the
desire for "truth in sentencing": the length of prison
sentences imposed by courts should correspond closely to
the amount of time inmates actually serve.
A few states have largely "descriptive" guidelines,
designed to help judges follow existing sentencing
norms more consistently But even these states usually
seek to make some "prescriptive" changes in prior norms
(especially to eliminate racial disparities). In other states,
the most common prescriptive changes have involved
increased sentence severity for violent and drug crimes.
Minnesota, Washington, and Kansas explicitly based
their guidelines on retributive, or "just deserts" theories
of punishment, placing greater emphasis on the severity
of the current offense, and less on offender characteristics. However, even these states still leave substantial
room for offender-based sentences designed to achieve
rehabilitative, incapacitative, or special deterrent goals?
Increasingly, states are turning to sentencing
guidelines with a primary goal of gaining control over
rapidly escalating prison populations. Such control is
made possible by the greater uniformity and predictability of guideline sentences, in comparison with
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previous indeterminate sentencing regimes. Minnesota pioneered this approach in 198o, and explicitly
adopted a goal of never exceeding 95 percent of
available prison capacity. That goal was achieved
throughout the first decade of guideline sentencing;
prison populations did increase, but at rates much
slower than in other states. Prison construction and
expansion were thus able to accommodate inmate
population increases without overcrowding or
multiple-bunking of high-security inmates. In
contrast, Pennsylvania did not recognize resourcematching as a goal until the start of its second decade
of guideline sentencing; by that time, prisons and jails
were operating at about io percent of capacity.
Starting in the mid-i 9 8os, as prison overcrowding problems grew around the country, a number of
states (North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, and
Washington) adopted guidelines linked to available
resources. This trend received substantial recognition
and support in the new ABA Standards. Resourcematching is a central principle of these Standards, but
was not even mentioned in the 1979 version. The
ABA's major shift in emphasis, from uniformity to
resource-matching, mirrors changes taking place in
state guidelines during the i98os.
A related and very important principle found in the
prior and the current edition of the ABA Standards is the
concept of "parsimony": sanctions should be the least
severe necessary to achieve the purposes of the sentence. 6 This principle was adopted by Minnesota in 198o,
and has been recognized in several other states. A similar
principle is contained in Section 3553(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act, but it has largely been ignored by the
Sentencing Commission and the federal courts. 7 The
principle is grounded in reasons of economy and
humane treatment of offenders, and also has implications for punishment theory: if sentences may be
mitigated for reasons of parsimony, this implies that "just
deserts" considerations do not, in many cases, narrowly
limit the permissible range of sanction severity.
E. Principal Determinants of Guidelines Sentences

All guideline states base their recommended sentences
primarily on the conviction offense and the offender's
prior conviction record. Although non-conviction
offense details play some role (e.g., enhancements for
weapon-use, regardless of whether such use was an
element of the charged offense), the guidelines states
are unanimous in rejecting the broader "real offense"
approach of the federal guidelines, which permit
frequent and quite substantial enhancements based on
uncharged "relevant conduct."
The federal approach was apparently designed to
prevent prosecutors from granting undue or inconsistent leniency by means of selective charging and plea
bargaining concessions. Except for Washington, the
guideline states place no limits on prosecutorial
discretion; even Washington's limits are vague, and
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not judicially enforceable. Nevertheless, this seeming
"loophole" does not seem to have caused any widespread dissatisfaction with state guidelines.
Most states have promulgated guidelines in the
form of a two-dimensional grid, but a few (Alaska,
Delaware, and Ohio) employ narrative rules for each
offense or offender group. State grids vary widely in
their layouts and "cell" ranges. There are also major
variations in severity ranking of offenses, formulas for
computing prior record, good-time credit amounts, and
the nature and extent of factors which permit (or do not
permit) departure. Criminal history scoring is particularly diverse. These variations reflect differences in
sentencing goals and state traditions, as well as the
relatively primitive state of sentencing jurisprudence
(which, prior to determinate sentencing, was rarely
addressed in reported opinions or scholarly articles).
F. Case Monitoring, Research, and Evaluation Processes

One of the most important features of sentencing
guideline reforms is their empirical research component. Most permanent, legislatively-created guideline
commissions have been given a mandate to collect and
analyze sentencing data, not only as background for
development of the initial guidelines, but also as a
means of monitoring implementation and proposing
later revisions. This empirical component has become
more and more important as states have begun to focus
on the goal of predicting and preventing future prison
overcrowding. Such predictions require detailed
information on current sentencing practices, and
development of sophisticated, computerized models
which can combine data on current and expected
caseloads, presumptive sentences, and other factors
known to have an impact on inmate populations.
Despite these important applications of guideline
data, and the research mandates of most state commissions, there is surprisingly little published data, and
even fewer published evaluations by researchers
independent of the commissions. In some cases, this
is because the guidelines are too new to have generated significant sentencing data; in older systems, data
may not be collected due to inadequate commission
staffing and budget. When data is collected, it is not
always known, or fully available, to outside researchers. Finally, such data, even when available, is usually
not in a form which permits meaningful crossjurisdictional comparisons. The need for better and
more comparable data is discussed below.
II.Key Issues in Future State and Federal Guideline
Reforms
A. The Need for Balance inSentencing Policy
The most important fact about state guideline systems
is that they have survived and multiplied. Unlike the
federal guidelines, which have been widely attacked,
state guidelines have attracted relatively little sustained
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criticism, and continue to be adopted by other states.
What accounts for this higher degree of acceptance at the state level? My own hypothesis is that state
guidelines are more popular because they are, in a
variety of ways, more balanced than the federal
version. Sentencing issues are, by their nature, highly
controversial, and sentencing goals and limitations are
often in conflict with each other. The best that can be
hoped for is to achieve a relatively balanced and stable
compromise on key issues. Such issues include (i) the
relative weight given to different purposes of punishment, and to offense versus offender characteristics;
(2) the proper balance between uniformity and
flexibility; (3) the degree of sanction severity (overall,
and among different offenses and offender groups);
and (4) the proper allocation of sentencing power
among the principal institutions and actors - the
legislature, the sentencing commission, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, correctional officers and judges.
In each of these four areas, I believe that state
guidelines are generally more balanced than the
federal version. Offender characteristics seem to
receive more weight in state systems; departures are
more common; sentencing is less severe (e.g., fewer
mandatory minimum sentences; more frequent
probation; explicit recognition of prison population
management and "parsimony" goals); and sentencing
power, at both policy-making and individual case
levels, is shared more broadly.
Further research will be needed to test this theory,
but assuming it is true,' what accounts for the better
balance, and thus broader support, of state guidelines?
A larger, more representative sentencing commission
may help (although Alaska seems to have maintained
broad support without any permanent commission).
The legislative role may also be critical: legislators
must support the sentencing commission's independence (and budget), and should avoid micro-managing
sentencing policy, but they must exercise enough
oversight to prevent the commission from being
captured by any narrow interest or perspective.
Two issues of "balance" deserve particular
emphasis in future research and debate. First, what is
the proper mix of uniformity and flexibility? Are
guidelines useful, and do judges tend to follow them,
even if they are largely "voluntary"? Second, when (if
ever) should parole release discretion be retained?
Does such discretion defeat the central goals of
uniformity, truth-in-sentencing, and front-end prison
population management? Is parole discretion still a
needed prison "safety valve," or is this function
adequately served by accurate population forecasts
(combined, if necessary, with the option of retroactively applying mitigating guideline amendments)?
B.The Conundrum of Prosecutorial Discretion

No sentencing reform, state or federal, has yet resolved
the problem of prosecutorial charging and plea
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bargaining discretion. The conviction-offense approach universally adopted in state guidelines risks
giving prosecutors too much power to "dictate" a
sentence which is, under the circumstances, too
severe or too lenient. However, even the limited "real
offense" approach of the federal guidelines seems too
lawless - and does not, in fact, prevent prosecutors
from dominating the court's view of the "real" facts,
and thus dictating the sentence.
Subject to further research, I would offer two
tentative conclusions based on state experiences. First,
the absence of any serious attempt to regulate
prosecutorial decisions reflects the extraordinary
difficulty of enforcing such controls in an adversary
system. This may yet be possible, but it will be very
difficult- especially to impose lower limits on charge
and recommended-sentence severity (since, in most
cases, neither the prosecution nor the defense will
appeal cases of leniency). Second, the absence of
widespread complaints about prosecutorial dominance in state guidelines systems suggests that,
perhaps, closer regulation is not needed. Specifically,
my hypothesis would be that, in a properly balanced
guideline system- one with reasonable sentence
severity levels and few mandatory minimum statutes,
and in which courts retain substantial discretion to
depart -it is rare that prosecutorial decisions produce
sentences which judges strongly disapprove, yet are
powerless to prevent (as in federal courts).
C. The Critical Importance of "Front-End" Resource-Matching

Governments, like individuals, must learn to live within
their means, and keep their promises. These simple
moral precepts are particularly important in sentencing.
Politicians are always quite willing to increase penalties,
but rarely agree to lower them, and are even more
reluctant to raise taxes to pay for higher penalties. The
all-too-common result: serious prison overcrowding,
court intervention, and resort to increasingly desperate
prison releasing measures (accelerated parole, furloughs, etc.). However, such "back-door" solutions only
make problems worse because they increase the
disparity between the prison terms imposed by courts
and the length of time actually served.
At some point, this approach breaks down; timeserved becomes so small, in comparison to sentences
imposed,9 that both the public and offenders lose respect
for the sentencing process. Offenders learn that they can
"beat the system;" legislators and the public become even
more frustrated, and push for harsher sanctions.
Meanwhile, judges are encouraged to continue to overuse prison sentences for non-violent offenders who can
and should receive community-based sanctions.
Because presumptive sentences are more
uniform, they permit more accurate predictions of the
impact of current or proposed penalties on future
correctional populations. Such predictions may be
especially accurate (and are even more vitally impor-
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tant) if parole, as well as judicial, discretion is
curtailed. Accurate resource-need predictions allow
legislators to either appropriate the funds to expand
prison capacity in time to meet the demand, reduce
the demand by lowering prison commitment rates or
durations for certain offenders, or pursue a combination of these approaches.
Most important of all, in the current "get tough"
climate: if politicians can be told in fairly specific
terms what various penalty increases will cost, they
will be forced to take responsibility for their proposals,
in terms of increased taxes, cuts in popular programs,
or early release of other offenders.
Linking sentencing policy to resources also allows the
public and elected officials to take a comprehensive view
of sentencing policy; to set priorities in the allocation of
limited prison space; and to explore less costly and more
effective alternatives to incarceration. Legislators are thus
in a better position to resist knee-jerk, "lock-em-up"
responses to short-term public hysteria over particular
heinous crimes; such ad hoc responses generate a leapfrog progression of steadily escalating penalties.
All crimes are terrible, but limited resources (and
equally pressing competing social needs) require hard
choices. Which offenses are relatively more serious?
Which offenders require secure detention? For other
offenders, what non-custodial sanctions are available to
deter and punish crime, facilitate rehabilitation, and
promote victim and community restitution?
In light of this, front-end resource-matching
should be seen as an essential component of state and
federal sentencing systems. To make such a system
work, however, some government body (probably
independent of the legislature) must have the budget
and the legal duty to collect detailed sentencing data,
make resource-need predictions, and publish them.
Accurate predictions will only be possible if sentencing achieves a certain minimum degree of uniformity.
This may mean that guidelines must be more than
"voluntary," and that parole release must be at least
partially structured. As noted above, these are issues
for further research, comparing guideline states with
and without these features.
D. Increasing the Use of Intermediate Sanctions

One of the risks of giving greater emphasis to sentencing uniformity and proportionality may be the
tendency to encourage, or at least perpetuate, heavy
reliance on custodial sentencing options -days or
months in custody provide a convenient "coin" of
punishment severity. But as noted above, presumptive
sentencing - if linked to available resources - can also
promote increased use of intermediate sanctions
(intensive supervision probation, day fines, community service, home detention, day-reporting centers,
work release, treatment, etc). Sentencing commissions
can greatly increase the use and fairness of such
sanctions by incorporating them into the scheme of
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presumptive sentences, and by developing "exchange
rates" permitting choice of a wide variety of sanctions
deemed to have roughly equivalent punitive impact.'The guideline states have done a lot more with this
than has the federal commission, but much work
remains to be done. Central questions of policy and
practice remain unanswered: Can intermediate sanctions
be regulated without creating the excessive complexity
which afflicts the federal guidelines?" Should minimum as well as maximum severity limits be defined,
and can they be enforced? Can consensus be reached
on specific exchange rates for fundamentally different
sanction types (e.g., jail, home detention, fines, and
community service)? How should violations of release
conditions be sanctioned, to assure consistency,
maximize compliance, and minimize resort to custodial
measures?
E. The Centrality of Empirical Research

As noted in Part I, case-monitoring amd research are
major components of most state guideline reforms, but
the data collected, and the extent of commission and
outside evaluations, are still inadequate. Better data, and
more research, are essential if sentencing guidelines are
to achieve their full potential. Sentencing commissions
and legislators need feedback on how current rules are
working, and what future resources will be needed;
state and federal reformers need to be able to learn from
each others' experiences with different approaches.
There is a particularly strong need for measures
permitting valid cross-jurisdictional comparisons. For
example, published guideline compliance rates
reflect major differences in legal definitions of what
constitutes a "departure" (e.g., probationary sentences given to certain first offenders would be
deemed departures in Minnesota, but not in Washington). Similarly, comparisons of prison overcrowding are hampered by variations in definitions of
.capacity;" comparisons of sentencing severity levels
are hazardous, given the absence of comparable,
offense-specific data on sentences imposed and time
actually served.
Until more uniform data becomes available,
researchers and officials will have to rely on indirect
or approximate measures. For example, the extent of
substantive appellate caselaw in a state may provide a
useful index of the degree to which its guidelines
actually restrict trial court discretion. Approximate
comparisons of sentencing severity between jurisdictions (or within a single jurisdiction at different time
periods) can be based on the ratios of total prison and
jail populations to the number of adult arrests,
convictions, or some other meaningful base.'1
Conclusion
The experience of the states suggests that presumptive
sentencing laws can help to reduce sentencing
disparities without imposing excessive rigidity, and can
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be based on conviction offense without allowing
prosecutors to dominate sentencing.' 3 Determinate
sentencing laws do, however, increase the political
visibility of "real time" sentences, and thus create a risk
of escalating penalties and overcrowded prisons, with
no parole "safety valve." The experience of states like
Minnesota shows that these problems can be controlled
if presumptive sentences are explicitly linked to, and
limited by, available correctional resources. This is the
central innovation of the revised ABA Standards, and
should be considered an essential feature of future
reforms. It is also becoming one of the most important
reasons for states to adopt guidelines. Parole and other
"back door" release mechanisms can deal with prison
overcrowding, but they cannot achieve either "truth in
sentencing" (matching time-imposed to time-served) or
the most efficient use of limited prison capacity.
Sentencing guidelines seem likely to continue to
thrive and spread in the states, whereas the future of
the federal guidelines remains very much in doubt.
But before this approach is abandoned in federal
courts, more attention should be given to the lessons
of state guideline experience. State reforms are, in
important ways, quite different from the federal
version, and those differences may very well prove to
be the key to their greater success.
Notes
1 See infra text at note 3 (17 states have adopted guidelines).
2 However, as illustrated by the Texas essay in this Issue,
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supra note 8, at 632.
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